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Oil and Gas: Roye Realty & Developing v. Watson - An
Answer to the Take-or-Pay Royalty Issue in Oklahoma or
Simply More Confusion?

L Introduction
The oil and gas industry is, by now, well aware of the issues surrounding take-orpay gas contracts and the historical practices that spawned numerous lawsuits since
1982. First sparked by declining economic conditions in the natural gas market,

pipeline companies were forced to default on take-or-pay contracts with natural gas
producers, exposing themselves to billions of dollars of liability. The settlement of

a majority of these lawsuits has generated its own litigation, with royalty owners
asserting a right to settlement proceeds. During the last decade, much has been

written regarding royalty owners' rights to receive a portion of the proceeds under
take-or-pay contracts, and, until recently, most of the discussion was mere
speculation based on a handful of cases that failed to adequately resolve many
questions.' However, in the past year, several jurisdictions handed down decisions
involving take-or-pay settlements.2 This, in turn, will likely be the subject of even
more articles.
This note examines the recent decision by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Roye
Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Watson.3 The closely divided court held in a five-tofour decision that royalty owners are not entitled to share in take-or-pay payments
absent clear language in the oil and gas lease expressing a contrary intent.4 Courts
and commentators have devoted a considerable amount of time examining the early
cases involving take-or-pay settlements, and this author wishes to avoid merely
restating the opinions of those who came before. However, a brief sojourn into the
1. See, e.g., John S. Lowe, Defining the Royalty Obligation,49 SMU L. REv. 223 (1996); Ryan E.
Griffitts, Comment, Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Arkla, Inc.: Two Steps Forwardand Two Steps
Back in the Take-Or-PaySaga, 20 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv. 219 (1995); Patricia A. Brown, Note, Klein

v. Jones: Equitable Right to Royalties on Take-or-Pay Settlements, 47 ARK. L. REv. 749 (1994); Kirk
J. Bily, Comment, Royalty on Take-or-PayPayments and Related ConsiderationAccruing to Producers,
27 Hous. L. REv. 105 (1990); Angela Jeanne Crowder, Comment, Take-or-Pay Payments and
Settlements - Does the Landowner Share?, 49 LA. L. ReV. 921 (1989).
2. See, e.g., Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell, 98 F.3d 1222, 1236-37 (10th Cir. 1996) (interpreting
New Mexico law and holding that State as lessor was not entitled to royalty payment on take-or-pay
settlement proceeds unless proceeds were ultimately recouped in exchange for actual production);
Independent Petroleum Assn v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (invalidating Department
of Interior policy decision to collect royalties on take-or-pay settlement buyout payment); Williamson
v. Elf Aquitaine, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1163, 1169 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (applying Mississippi law and holding
that nonrecoupable cash settlement of take-or-pay dispute was subject to royalty payment obligation);
Transamerica Natural Gas Corp. v. Finkelstein, 933 S.W.2d 591, 600 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996,
n.w.h.) (rejecting unjust enrichment claim for royalty on take-or-pay settlement monies).
3. No. 76848, 1996 WVL 515794 (Okla. Sept. 10, 1996).
4. See id. at *9.
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industry's historical practices is necessary to understand the context in which this
case arose. As such, this note will briefly review the economic and regulatory
environment that gave rise to the take-or-pay problem, and the first cases to decide
a royalty owner's right to share in settlement proceeds. Second, this note will review
the legal framework from which the early decisions arose and the fundamental
differences between the jurisdictions in interpreting oil and gas leases. Finally, this
note will analyze the Roye Realty court's opinion in light of Oklahoma interpretative
principles as applied to other provisions of the oil and gas lease.
II. Industry Background
A. History of the Take-or-Pay Wars
In the early stages of the modem natural gas industry, producers had little or no
incentive to make the capital expenditures necessary to drill a well. Given the
incipient state of the market, producers had no assurance of sales sufficient to
maintain their leases.5 Early gas contract provisions requiring pipeline companies
to take a certain quantity of gas were of relatively little value. If the pipeline
breached the contract only to take at a later date, the damages for such breach could
potentially be limited to the time value of the money that would have been received
by performance of the contract.'
Historically, pipeline companies have occupied a merchant role in the industry.
In other words, they purchased from the producers and resold to public utilities and
industrial users whco required large amounts of natural gas. Consequently, pipelines
desired to enter into long-term purchase contracts with producers to secure an
adequate supply for their customers.7 Virtually all of these long-term contracts
drafted in the 1970s contained take-or-pay provisions,8 requiring the pipeline to take
a minimum quantity of gas on an annual basis or pay the producer the difference
between the amount actually taken and the amount required under the contract."

5. See Paul Strohl, HardTimes, Settling the Take-or-Pay Claim: The Producer'sPerspective,3 NAT.
RESOuRcES & ENv'r 11, 11 (1989).

6. See id.
7. See Michael P. Pearson & Richard D. Watt, To Share or Not to Share: Royalty Obligations
Arising out of Take-or-Pay or Similar Gas ContractLitigation, 42 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N
§ 14.01, § 14.021], at 14-5 (1991).
8. A sample take-or-pay clause is as follows:
Subject to the other terms and provisions of this Agreement, Seller agrees to sell to Buyer,
and Buyer agree; to purchase and take delivery thereof from Seller, or pay for if made
available hereunder but not taken, a Minimum Annual Contract Quantity of Gas during

the term hereof equal to eighty percent (80%) of Seller's Maximum Deliverability from
each well subject to this Agreement.

Id. at 14-6 n.4.
9. An oft-quoted definition of a take-or-pay clause is as follows:

Aclause in a Gas Purchase Contract ... requiring the purchaser to take, or failing to take,
to pay for the minimum annual contract volume of gas which the producer-seller has
available for delivery. Under such clause the purchaser usually has the right to take the
gas paid for (but undelivered) in succeeding years.
8 HOWARD R. WILuAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW 1099 (1996).
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This mutually beneficial practice encouraged producers to enter into leases and
develop natural gas wells, knowing that there would be a market for the gas
produced, and guaranteed the pipelines an adequate supply of gas to meet the
market demand.
A majority of these contracts provided the pipeline a period of time to make up
any deficiencies for gas paid but not taken. In most cases, the pipeline would have
the right through so-called "recoupment provisions" to credit gas taken in excess of
the minimum contract amount against previous take-or-pay payments. The gas taken
under these provisions is commonly referred to as "make-up gas.' This arrangement
worked well for both pipeline and producer while rates were increasing; unfortunately, however, the industry failed to anticipate future economic and regulatory
conditions that would eventually result in a sharp decline in prices and a restructuring of the marketplace.
Beginning in the early 1970s, the United States experienced significant shortages
of natural gas, prompting the Federal Power Commission (FPC) and Congress to
drastically change the way the natural gas industry was regulated."0 Following the
passing of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA)," exploration and
production significantly increased, and by 1982,2 there was an excess supply of
natural gas: Yet, pipelines found themselves bound to expensive, long-term gas
contracts in a market where they could not recover their purchase costs through
subsequent sales. 3
Facing bankruptcy, pipeline companies were forced to attempt to renegotiate their
gas contracts with producers or, in most cases, simply discontinue the take-or-pay
payments and refuse to take any more gas.' 4 Naturally, the producers filed suit for
breach of contract. At first, pipelines asserted a variety of defenses in an attempt
to avoid the gas contracts, including force majeure and commercial impracticability." The pipelines' efforts to avoid the contracts largely failed, 6 and,
10. Historically, the oil and gas industry was subject to dual regulatory conditions in the interstate
and intrastate markets. The United States Supreme Court case of PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,
347 U.S. 672 (1954), had rendered interstate wellhead sales of natural gas to pipelines subject to FPC
rate regulation. Pipelines operating solely within the boundaries of an individual state, however, were
not subject these rate regulations. As such, there was little incentive for intrastate producers to enter the
interstate market where their profits were limited.
11. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1994)).
12. The NGPA phased out the historical distinction between the interstate and intrastate markets,
and encouraged exploration for new reserves by establishing incentive ceiling prices. See Pearson &
Watt, supra note 7, at 14-8.
13. See Bruce M. Kramer, Liability to Royalty Owners for Proceeds From Take-or-Pay and
Settlement Payments, 15 E. MIN. L. FOuND. § 14.01 (1994).
14. See id.
15. Pipelines have claimed that economic recessions, falling prices, mild winters, and federal
regulations are all events beyond their control that fall within their force majeure contract provision.
Likewise, pipelines argue these events make it commercially impractical to perform. However, these
events are merely foreseeable risks - performance under the contract is still possible, just not profitable.
For a detailed discussion of these defenses and cases rejecting them, see John Burritt McArthur, The
Take-or-PayCrisis:Diagnosis,Treatment,and Curefor Immorality in the Marketplace,22 N.M. L. REV.

353 (1992).
16. See, e.g., Kaiser-Francis Oil Co. v. Producer's Gas Co., 870 F.2d 563, 566 (10th Cir. 1989);
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coupled with initiatives passed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC),17 successor to the FPC, the pipelines felt pressure to settle the billions of

dollars of claims facing them." Following the resolution of these lawsuits between
producers and pipelines, the industry may very well have thought the take-or-pay
wars were over. Tc the contrary, they had just begun, as royalty owners marched
into court demanding a portion of the settlement proceeds.
B. The Early Decisions
Two early decisions by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
of Wyoming in 1988 set the stage for royalty owner and producer arguments
regarding royalty payments on take-or-pay proceeds. In State v. Pennzoil Co.,9 the
Wyoming Supreme Court considered whether the lessor of an oil and gas lease was
entitled to take-or-pay payments made to the lessee by a gas purchaser. The lessor
in Pennzoil was the State of Wyoming, who had entered into the lease through the
State's Board of Laild Commissioners. The Board argued, in part, that the royalty

provision in the lease was ambiguous, that the take-or-pay payments were made for
future production of gas, and that an advance royalty on that production was proper
to serve the intent of the parties."
The Pennzoil court rejected the Board's arguments, instead relying on common-

law oil and gas concepts to interpret the royalty provision. The court held that there
must be production and a subsequent sale of gas to trigger an obligation to pay

royalties.2' The court relied on decisions interpreting the habendum clauses in oil
and gas leases, finding that there must be severance of the mineral from the ground
to satisfy the "production" requirement.' The court additionally rejected the
argument that a "sale" of gas could be satisfied by the execution of gas purchase

Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 813 F.2d 77, 79-80 (5th Cir. 1987).
17. F.E.R.C. Order No. 380, 49 Fed. Reg. 22, 778 (1984) was the first of several orders regulating
the way pipelines calculated costs and applied for certificates authorizing transportation services, See
Pearson & Watt, supra vote 7, at 14-11 to 14-16.
18. While the statistics on total payments on take-or-pay settlements differ, one source reported that
as of October 31, 1991, interstate pipelines had paid $9.1 billion to producers on gas purchase contracts.
See Donald F. Santa, Jr. & Patricia J. Beneke, FederalNatural Gas Policy and the Energy Policy Act
of 1992, 14 ENERGY L.J. 1, 8 n.49 (1993).
19. 752 P.2d 975 fVyo. 1988).
20. See id. at 976.
21. See id. at 981. The royalty clause contained in the lease at issue was typical of royalty clauses
used in the industry and provided for royalties to be paid:
(ii) on gas, including casinghead gas or other hydrocarbon substance, producedfrom said
land saved and sold or used off the premises or in the manufacture of gasoline or other
products therefromn, the market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas so sold or used,
provided that on gas sold at the wells the royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount
realizedfrom such sale.
Id. at 976.
22. The purpose of the habendum clause is to describe the duration of the interests granted in the
oil and gas lease. See 2 EUGENE 0. KUNr_ A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL & GAS § 26.1, at 318
(1989).
23. See Pennzoil, 752 P.2d at 979.
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contracts, finding instead that "sale" requires a transfer of title in the gas.24
Without severing the gas from the ground (production), the producer had yet to gain
an interest in the gas which they could transfer to the pipeline. After concluding
there was no production and, consequently, no sale, the Pennzoil court denied the
lessor any royalty on the take-or-pay payments.'
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in DiamondShamrock Exploration
Co. v. Hodel,' also rejected a lessor's argument that the term "production" in the
leases at issue should be given a broad reading, thereby entitling the lessor to
royalty on take-or-pay payments. The Diamond Shamrock lessor was the federal
government,' and interpretation of the lease agreements required application of
several federal statutes, including the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(OCSLA)' and the Mineral Lands Leasing Act (MLLA).' The court defined the
term "production" to mean the actual physical severance of the minerals from the
ground." In rejecting the argument that take-or-pay payments should be included
in the "value of production," the court found an important distinction between
payments for the purchase of gas and take-or-pay payments for the pipeline's failure
to purchase the gas."' As such, the court concluded that the payments were merely
intended to compensate the producer for the risks inherent in developing the gas and
did not represent a part of the price paid for the gas.32
While these two decisions represent the beginning of judicial determination of a
lessee's obligation to pay royalties on take-or-pay payments, two important
distinctions must be made between these decisions and subsequent opinions by
courts interpreting leases between private individuals. First, the lessors in Pennzoil
and DiamondShamrock were both governmental entities who were responsible for
drafting the leases at issue. The importance of this fact cannot be overstated, as a
fundamental principle in construing oil and gas leases requires that the document
should be construed against the drafting party. 3 The application of this principle
usually results in the lease being construed against the lessee, in that most leases are
drafted by oil company-lessees and not by mineral owner-lessors.' However, this
was not the case in either Pennzoilor DiamondShamrock, where the lessors drafted
the leases and then asked the courts for an expansive reading of the document
which would entitle them to increased royalty payments. Second, the lessors sought
a royalty share of take-or-pay payments, not take-or-pay settlement proceeds,

24. See id. at 979-80.

25. See id. at 980.
26. 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1988).
27. The lessor in Diamond Shamrock was the United States Department of the Interior (DOI). See
ila at 1161.
28. Ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1994)).
29. Ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437 (1920) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1994)).
30. See Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1168.

31. See id. at 1167.
32. See id. at 1167-68.
33. See, e.g., Probst v. Ingram, 373 P.2d 58 (Okla. 1962); Simon v. Foster, 373 P.2d 28 (Okla.
1962). See generally Lowe, supra note 1.
34. See Klein v. Jones, 980 F.2d 521, 531 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying Arkansas law).
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leaving some commentators to theorize that royalties may still be due on settlement
payments under the lessee's implied duty to market the gas."s
C. The Development of Take-or-Pay Case Law
Texas appellate courts were the first to consider a royalty owner's rights to takeor-pay settlements. In Killam Oil Co. v. Bruni 6 (Bruni 1), an oil and gas lessor
who was responsible for drafting the lease brought suit against lessees seeking a
royalty share of proceeds received under a take-or-pay settlement. The lessor
alleged a breach of marketing duty, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing,
conversion, fraud, and also argued the take-or-pay provisions constituted a
constructive sale of the gas. The court applied principles of law enunciated in cases
construing royalty clauses of oil and gas leases, 7 holding that as a matter of law
no royalties are due on take-or-pay settlement proceeds." In reaching its
conclusion, the ccurt relied heavily on the established definition of the term
"production" in Tecas as meaning the actual physical extraction of the mineral from
the soil. 9 The court noted:
[The lessors], as drafters of the lease, could have specifically included
a provision allowing for royalties to be paid upon proceeds received...
from settlements of disputes arising from a breach of take-or-pay
provisions in gas contracts.... [The [lessor] unambiguously limited its
right to royalty payments only from gas actually extracted from the
land.'
On subsequent appeal, in Hurd Enterprises,Ltd. v. Brune' (Bruni II), the court
affirmed its earlier decision by the "law of the case" doctrine.4
Royalty owners in Texas tried a different approach to recover take-or-pay
proceeds in Mandell v. Hamman Oil & Refining Co.43 Following a settlement
between lessee and the Tennessee pipeline company on a take-or-pay gas contract,
royalty owners argued they were entitled to the proceeds as either a party or third-

35. For a detailed discussion on the implied covenant to market, see Randy King, Royalty Owner
Claims to Take-or-Pay Payments Under the Implied Covenant to Market and the Duty of Good Faith
and FairDealing, 33 S. TEX. .J. 801 (1992).
36. 806 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
37. The court relied on Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid, 337 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. 1960), Monsanto Co. v.
Tyrrell, 537 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ re'd n.r.e.), and Exxon Corp.
v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
38. See Killam, 805 S.W.2d at 268.
39. See id. at 267.
40. Id. at 267-68.
41. 828 S.W.2d ICI (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
42. The "law of the case" doctrine refers to the principle by which questions of law decided on
appeal to a court of last resort governs the case throughout its subsequent decisions. See id. at 106 n.7.
It was employed in Bruni II to avoid reconsidering the royalty owners rights in light of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision in Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 943 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1991), opinion reinstated
in part on reh'g, 976 P.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1992), which was handed down between Bruni I and Bruni I.
43. 822 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
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party beneficiary to the gas contract, and under the lessee's duty to market the gas.
The court found in favor of the lessee, holding that take or pay is not a benefit
associated with execution of a lease, nor does it flow from the implied covenant to
market gas." In so holding, the Mandell court relied on the Fifth Circuit's
DiamondShamrock decision, as well as Bruni I, in determining that take or pay is
not a payment for production, but for nonproduction. 4 In recognizing that
production is the key to royalty, occurring only upon physical severance from the
ground, the court held that take-or-pay payments made before gas is produced does
not constitute a payment for the sale of gas." Finally, the court rejected the
implied marketing covenant argument, holding that the duty to market only relates
to gas actually produced. 7
The development of case law in Arkansas and Louisiana has taken a markedly
different path. Beginning with Frey v. Amoco Production Co.," the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals deviated from its prior holding in Diamond Shamrock and held
that under Louisiana law49 and the terms of the lease before it,50 royalty was owed
on take-or-pay payments.5 The court relied on Louisiana's interpretation of an oil
and gas lease as equivalent to a cooperative venture, 2 whereby the lessor
contributes land in return for a share of the economic benefits anticipated from the
lease. The court distinguished its holding in DiamondShamrock on three grounds.
First, the leases contained different lease language.' Second, the Diamond
44. See id. at 165.
See id. at 164.
See id. at 165.
See id. at 164.
943 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1991), opinion reinstatedin part on reh'g, 976 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1992).
The Court of Appeals certified the following question to the Louisiana Supreme Court:
Whether under Louisiana law and the facts concerning the Lease executed by Amoco and
Frey, the Lease's clause that provides Frey a "royalty on gas sold by the Lessee of onefifth (1/5) of the amount realized at the well from such sales" requires Amoco to pay Frey
a royalty share of the take-or-pay payments that Amoco earns as a result of having
executed the Lease and under the terms of a gas sales contract with a pipeline-purchaser.
Frey, 951 F.2d at 68. The Louisiana Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. See Frey v. Amoco
Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 177 (La. 1992).
50. The lease royalty clause provided for royalties on "gas sold by Lessee [at] one-fifth (1/5) of the
amount realized at the well from such sales." Frey, 943 F.2d at 580 (alteration in original).
51. See id. at 584-86.
52. In Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982), the court reasoned:
Where the mineral lease provides for payment to the lessor of a fractional royalty interest,
the lease arrangement is in the nature of a cooperative venture: the lessor contributes the
land and the less the capital and expertise necessary to develop the minerals for the
mutual benefit of both parties.
Henry, 418 So. 2d at 1338. The court cited with approval Professor Harrell's statement that:
any determination of the market value of gas which ... permits either the lessor or lessee
to receive a part of the gross revenues from the property greater than the fractional
division contemplated by the lease, should be considered inherently contrary to the basic
nature of the lease and be sustained only in the clearest of cases.
Id. at 1338 n.10 (quoting Thomas Harrell, Developments in Non-Regulatory Oil & Gas Law, 30 INST.
ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 311, 336 (1979)).
53. The Diamond Shamrock lease called for royalty payable on "amount or value of production
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1996

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:751

Shamrock decision was based on federal law, while Frey concerned application of
Louisiana law. Finally, the lessor drafted the lease in Diamond Shamrock,
whereas the lessee prepared the lease in Frey.55
The court concluded that if lessors did not share in take-or-pay payments, lessees
would have an incentive to adjust prices under their contracts in return for
settlements with pipelines.' Those take-or-pay payments represented economic
benefits derived from the right to take gas from the premises, a right granted by the
lease.' The court found it would be inequitable to allow those benefits to accrue

exclusively to the lassee. 8
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals employed similar logic in arriving at its
decision in Klein v. Jones.59 In Klein, royalty owners' sought payments with
respect to take-or-pay settlement proceeds, alleging in part that they were third-party
beneficiaries to the gas purchase contracts and that the doctrine of unjust enrichment

warranted the court's intervention. The court rejected the lessor's third-party
beneficiary theory but agreed that intervention was necessary under equitable
principles.6' Relying on Harrell's view that a lease arrangement is a cooperative
venture and the Fifth Circuit's decision in Frey, the court agreed that the royalty
owners were entitled tb a share of the take-or-pay settlement proceeds.'

The most recent decision by a United States Circuit Court of Appeals addressing
this issue is Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell." In Harvey, the Tenth Circuit denied
the State of New Mexico's claim for royalty on take-or-pay settlement proceeds.?

saved, removed, or sold" whereas the Frey lease calculated royalty on "the amount realized at the well
from [the sale of gas]." See Frey, 943 F.2d at 581 (alteration and emphasis in original).
54. Among the Louisiana statutes relied on by the court were LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2450 (West
1952) (defining sale); Lt. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2050 (West 1987) (contract interpretation principles); and
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:122 (West 1989) (requiring lessee to perform contract in good faith and act
as for mutual benefit of himself and lessor).
55. In Louisiana, contractual ambiguities must be resolved against the drafting party. See LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 2056 (West 1987).
56. See Frey, 943 F.2d at 585.
57. See id. at 584.
58. See id.

59. 980 F.2d 521 (3th Cir. 1992).
60. The lease royalty clauses provided:
Lessee shall pay Lessor as royalty on gas, caslnghead gas, distillate, condensate, and other
gaseous substance produced from said land and sold or used by Lessee off of the land or
in the manufacture of gasoline or other products, the market value at the mouth of the
wells of one-eighth (1/8) of such products so sold or used. On all gas, casinghead gas,
condensate and distillate sold at the wells by the Lessee the royalty shall be one-eighth
(1/8) of the amoint realized from such sales.
Id. at 525.
61. See id. at 526-31.
62. See supra note 52.

63. See Klein, 980 F.2d at 528-31. The court also relied on Arkansas statutory scheme, finding it
analogous to the Louisiana statute's relied on by the Court in Frey. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-74-705
(Michie 1987) (requirin:g that lessee protect lessors interest).
64. 98 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 1996).
65. See id. at 1237
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The facts in Harvey were similar to those in Diamond Shamrock and Pennzoil, in
that the lessor drafted the lease and the court applied the law of jurisdictions
requiring actual production to trigger the royalty obligation. However, the Harvey
court did remand the case for a factual determination as to whether the settlement
proceeds were attributable, in part, to a price adjustment for the actual production
of gas.'
The circuit court decisions, when viewed in relation to the Texas cases, seem to
point to the conclusion that jurisdictions employing a "plain terms "' reading to
leases would deny royalty on take-or-pay proceeds, whereas jurisdictions who
regularly looked beyond the language of the lease, such as courts applying the
cooperative venture theory, would allow royalty owners a share of proceeds.' At
this point, one would expect Oklahoma to follow the Frey and Klein opinions, given
the fact that Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Louisiana all utilize similar interpretation
methods allowing a court to look beyond the lease with regard to market price
valuation in gas royalty clauses. ' At least one commentator argued that not only
was Oklahoma likely to adopt the cooperative venture theory but also that royalty
owners might also prevail on a production argument under the plain terms of the
0
lease, in light of Oklahoma decisions rejecting the Texas definition of production.'
Such was not the case, however, as the Oklahoma Supreme Court recently held that
royalty owners are not entitled to take-or-pay payments.
II. Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Watson7'
A. Facts
Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. (Roye), lessee, and R.D. and Dorothy Watson
(Watsons), lessors, executed oil and gas leases with a one year primary term
covering various lands in Haskell County, Oklahoma. Roye subsequently drilled and
completed gas wells capable of producing in paying quantities within the primary
term of the leases. Following completion of the wells, Roye entered into a gas
purchase agreement with Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company (Arkla), whereby Arkla
agreed to purchase a minimum quantity of gas or pay for the difference by means
of a typical take-or-pay clause. This purchase agreement was the subject of
litigation between Arkla and Roye, n resulting in a confidential settlement
agreement betveen the two parties. Shortly thereafter, the Watsons demanded a
share of the settlement proceeds by way of the lease agreement to which Roye

66. See id.
67. The phrase "plain terms" is used hereinafter to refer to the lease intepretation method that will
not read additional benefits, such as the right to share in take-or-pay proceeds, into the royalty clause.
68. For a thorough discussion of the differences between the plain terms and cooperative venture
jurisdictions, see generally Lowe, supra note I.

69. All three jurisdictions follow the Tara rule discussed in Part IV of this note.
70. See King, supra note 35, at 831.
71. No. 76848, 1996 WL 515794 (Okla. Sept. 10, 1996).
72. Arda Energy Resources v. Roye Realty & Developing, Case No. C-86-67 (Okla. Dist. Ct.
settlement agreement dated Feb. 6, 1989).
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responded by initiating suit requesting a declaratory judgment defining the rights
and liabilities of the respective parties. The Watsons filed an answer, counterclaimedI and added Arkla as a third-party defendant.
Roye, Arkla, and the Watsons each filed motions for summary judgment
regarding whether the Watsons were entitled to share in the take-or-pay settlement
proceeds.7' The district court ruled in favor of Roye and Arkla" and denied the
Watsons' motion for summary judgment.75 The Oklahoma Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that Roye effectively marketed the gas by granting Arkla a right
to refuse under the take-or-pay provision.' In finding that the trial court's granting
of summary judgment was premature, the court of appeals held that the Watsons
were entitled to royalties based upon the take-or-pay settlement as a matter of
law. Arkla and Roye petitioned the Oklahoma Supreme Court for certiorari and,
after granting certiorari on this first-impression question, the court vacated the court
of appeals decision and affirmed the trial court's decision."
B. Decision
Justice Hargrav.e, in writing for the narrow majority, devoted the majority of the
court's opinion to restating the law in surrounding jurisdictions, with little
explanation as to why the court chose the particular course of action it did. The
court's opening paragraph in discussing royalty owners' rights to take-or-pay
settlements discussed the current split among the jurisdictions as follows:
Those jurisdictions favoring the producer rely primarily on a strict
interpretation of the language in the leases concerning what constitutes
a "sale" and "production", while those jurisdictions finding for the
royalty owners have adopted a broader "economic benefit" test based
on the lessee's implied covenant to market gas and on unjust enrichment
theories."
After providing an overview of the leading cases, which have been previously
discussed in Part Il of this note, the court moved on to the arguments raised by the
parties and the amici curiae."
73. The Watsons counterclaimed for breach of contract, failure to pay proceeds from production as
required under title 52, section 540 of the Oklahoma Statutes (now 52 OKLA. STAT. § 570.10 (Supp.
1996)), breach of fiduciary duty, declaratory judgment, accounting, third party beneficiary, and punitive
damages. See Roye Rcalty, 1996 WL 515794, at *11 n.l.
74. Roye and Arkla additionally filed motions for a protective order, arguing that the Watsons were
not entitled to receive a copy of the settlement agreement. This motion was never ruled on. See Roye
Realty, 1996 WL 515794, at *2.
75. The OkIahorna Supreme Court promptly affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Arkla as a
defendant because Arkda had settled with Roye and was not responsible for any monies owed the
Watsons. See id. at *3 (relying on 52 OKLA. STAT. § 540 (1991)).
76. See id. at 02.
77. See id. at *3.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. The importance of the issues presented in this case is evidenced by the numerous anicus curiae
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The Roye Realty court devoted little time to analyzing the arguments raised by
the parties, but instead offered a brief summary. In its motion for summary
judgment, Roye argued that the Watsons were not entitled to a portion of the
settlement proceeds because the Watsons were not third-party beneficiaries to the
gas contract nor was the gas purchase contract incorporated into the leases.' The
Watsons argued that they were third-party beneficiaries under the gas purchase
contract and that following the settlement, the amount received for the sale of gas
significantly decreased.'
The Roye Realty court also summarized the arguments contained in the amicus
curiae briefs. The briefs on the producer's behalf distinguished the cases holding in
favor of royalty owners on the grounds that the royalty clauses in those cases did
not require "production."' Additionally, they reasoned that take-or-pay payments
were not payments for gas but payments to encourage exploration and reduce the
risk faced by the producer.' The briefs in favor of the royalty owner argued that
the Watsons were not seeking the enforcement of the royalty clause but the implied
covenant to market.' They further argued that the lease should be construed for
the mutual economic benefit of both lessor and lessee, entitling the lessor to share
in take-or-pay payments.'
The Roye Realty court needed less than half a page to explain why a royalty
owner is not entitled to share in take-or-pay settlements. After reading the royalty
clauses, the court noted that royalty was payable on gas produced and sold.' The
court defined the word "produced" as meaning not only discovery of the mineral but
also its physical extraction from the ground.' The court also found that gas is

briefs filed by the Oklahoma Mineral Owners Association, Oklahoma Independent Petroleum Association,
National Association of Royalty Owners and the Oklahoma Chapter of the National Association of
Royalty Owners, and Oklahoma-Kansas Mid-Continent Oil & Gas Association.
82. See Roye Realty, 1996 WL 515794, at *7.
83. See id.
84. See id.
at *8.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. at *9.There were actually two royalty clauses before the court for interpretation. They
provided:

Lessee covenants and agrees to pay lessor as royalty on all oil, condensate, gas, asphalt
and other minerals and substances produced, saved and sold from the premises one-eighth
of the gross proceeds received from the sale thereof at the mouth of the well, or if not
sold at the mouth of the well but sold or used off the premises or for the manufacture of
gasoline or any other product, then one-eighth of the market value thereof at the mouth
of the well ....

To pay lessor for gas of whatsoever nature or kind (with all of its constituents)
produced and sold or used off the leased premises or used in the manufacture of products
therefrom, 25% of the gross proceeds received for the gas sold, used off premises, or in
the manufacture of products therefrom, but in no event more than 25% of the actual
amount received by the lessee, said payments to be made monthly.
Id. at *9.
89. See id.
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"sold" when it enters the purchaser's line. Although the court recognized that oil
and gas leases are to be construed against the lessee and in favor of the lessor, the
court found that, absent clear language to the contrary, the intent of the parties did
not include sharing take-or-pay settlement proceeds with the royalty owners."
IV. Analysis of the Roye Court'sAuthority
A. Absence of Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey
Noticeably absent from the court's opinion was any reference to TaraPetroleum
Corp. v. Hughey, 2 Oklahoma's seminal case interpreting "market price" in a gas
royalty clause. The issue presented in Tara was whether royalties should be
calculated using the price established in a gas purchase contract between producer
and pipeline, or whether royalty was due based on the current market price. The
Tara court departed from the majority position, as enunciated by the Texas opinion
in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela.' The Vela court had held that a plain reading
of the gas royalty clause renders the contract price irrelevant for purposes of
determining royalty payments.'
The Tara court instead chose to look beyond the provisions of the lease,
recognizing that the "necessity of the market" calls for producers to enter into longterm gas purchase contracts.95 The court reasoned that basing the royalty payments
on fluctuating "current" prices would "not be fair to the producers." Finally, the
court held that:
The better rule - and the one we adopt - is that when a producer's
lease calls for royalty on gas based on the market price at the well and
the producer enters into an arm's-length, good faith gas purchase
contract with the best price and term available to the producer at the
time, that price is the "market price" and will discharge the producer's
gas royalty obligation.'
Simply put, the Tara decision bound royalty owners/lessors to the prices negotiated
in these long-term gas contracts between their lessees and the pipeline companies.
The practical effect of this decision was the incorporation of the contract price in
gas purchase contracts into the oil and gas lease royalty clause.
The Roye Realty court's failure to discuss Tara in its decision poses significant
precedential concerns when applied to future gas royalty issues, such as marketing
incentives and payments made for gas inventory charges." Tara requires an

90. See id.
91. See iU.

92. 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla.1981).
93. 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
94. See id. at 871.

95. See Tara, 630 P.2d at 1273.
96. Id.
97. Id. (footnotes omitted).
98. One commentator has expressed concern over the precedential effect of take-or-pay settlement
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inquiry into the reasonableness of the price negotiated by the lessor in the gas
purchase contract. This inquiry necessarily involves a determination of what
constitutes the contract price. Such an"inquiry may require an examination of those
inducements made to the lessee/producer in addition to the gas unit price stated in
the contract.
For example, a gas purchase contract providing for a $1 million advance payment
to the producer as an inducement to enter into the contract requiring the delivery of
1 million mcf of gas at $3/mcf could have royalty calculated on the $3 contract
price or on $4/mcf ($3 contract price + (advance/quantity of gas delivered)). If the
lessor could have set a $4/mcf contract price in lieu of receiving the advance, the
application of Tara to the preceding example leaves a court with two options. It
could either: 1) find the lessee failed to negotiate at arm's length, thereby breaching
the obligation to market the gas for the best possible price; or 2) a court could add
the advance to the $3/mcf contract price and order the lessee to pay royalties based
on the $4/mcf figure.
Likewise, the Roye Realty court should have considered whether the take-or-pay
proceeds constituted part of the price paid for gas under the contract. In doing so,
the court should have noted the circumstances surrounding the origins of take-or-pay
clauses. In particular, the ceiling prices established by the FPC in the interstate gas
market made price competition impossible for the pipelines. Lucrative take-or-pay
provisions in the 1970s developed as a way for pipelines to compete with each
other. °
It stands to reason that were it not for the price regulations, lessors would have
received royalties on higher contract prices. Instead, lessees have been the sole
beneficiary of the take-or-pay proceeds. At the very least, a discussion of Tara is
necessary to explain why such proceeds are not part of the contract price. Given
these obvious similarities between the issues presented in Tara and those in Roye
Realty, it is highly questionable as to why the Oklahoma Supreme Court failed to
mention Tara in the Roye opinion.
B. Roye's Reliance on Inapplicable Cases
1. Walden v. Potts
Perhaps even more alarming than the court's omission of Tara is the court's
reliance on two, arguably inapplicable, cases for its definition of the terms
"produced" and "sold" in Oklahoma. Relying on Walden v. Potts,' the court
stated that the word "produced" requires extraction from the ground."°
cases with regard to other forms of consideration lessee's receive in today's natural gas market, including
inventory charges allowed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. See 3A W.L. SUMMERS, THE
LAW OF OIL & GAS § 589A, at 43 (West Supp. 1996).
99. "Mcf" is one thousand cubic feet.
100. See Gregory M. Travalio, MeasuringSeller's DamagesforBreach ofLong-Term Gas Purchase
Contracts, 14 E. MIN. L. FOUND. § 23.03 n.119 (1993) (citing 4 W.L. SUMMERS, LAw OF OIL & GAS

§ 762).
101. 152 P.2d 923 (Okla. 1944).
102. See Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Watson, No. 76848, 1996 WL 515794, at *9 (Okla.
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Walden involved a dispute as to whether oil was produced in paying quantities'
or whether the lease terminated according to its terms. The lessor had instituted the
suit to cancel the oil and gas lease, alleging the lessee had ceased production
completely for periods of more than ten days, and had never produced oil in paying
quantities during the term of the lease.'" Evidence at trial showed that the oil
produced was of extremely low quality and could not cover operating costs."0 The
trial court found that "no oil and gas was ever discovered or produced in paying
quantities from said premises and no well was ever completed to warrant the
extension or continuance of said lease."'" The Walden court affirmed, holding that
production in paying quantities means that oil must be produced in quantities that
will pay a profit tc the lessee over operating expenses."l Accordingly, the court
agreed that the viell never produced oil or gas in paying quantities."0
It must be assumed that the Roye Realty court relied on the Walden trial court's
quotation above for support of its proposition that "production" requires extraction,
as no other language in the Walden opinion comes close to the definition given by
the court. Needless to say, the language in Walden hardly supports the bold
proposition made by Roye Realty. To the contrary, it is firmly established in
Oklahoma that the term "production" as used in the habendum clause only requires
the capability of production, not actual production, to extend a lease into its
secondary term.'" The Oklahoma position differs substantially from states
following the majority rule, such as Texas, which hold that a well must be
producing in paying quantities at the end of the primary term to extend the lease
into the secondary term."' Oklahoma, however, merely requires discovery and the
capability of production, coupled with diligent efforts to market the gas to preserve
the lease."' Moreover, it is a fundamental principle in construing oil and gas
leases that the court should consider all provisions in the lease and use each
provision to help interpret others."' Accordingly, the term "production" should be
given the same meaning in the gas royalty clause as it is in the habendum clause

Sept. 10, 1996).
103. A well must not only be producing oil or gas but must also be producing in such quantities
as will enable the operator to recover a profit if the lease is to survive. See Walden, 152 P.2d at 924.
This requirement has been the subject of much litigation, as it requires a determination of what expenses
and revenues should be included in the calculation.
104. See id.

See id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 924-25.
109. See, e.g., State ex reL Comm'r of Land Office v. Amoco Prod. Co., 645 P.2d 468, 470 (Okla.
1982) ("It is the ability of the lease to produce that is the important factor rather than actual
105.
106.
107.
108.

production ....
");
Gard v. Kaiser, 582 P.2d 1311 (Okla. 1978); McEvoy v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
624 P.2d 559 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980).
110. Monsanto Co. v. Tyrrell, 537 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ
refd n.r.e.).

111. See supra notes 92, 109.
112. See Panhandle Coop. Royalty Co. v. Cunningham, 495 P.2d 108, 113 (Okla. 1971).
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of a lease. In other words, only the capability of production, not actual production,
is necessary to incur an obligation to pay royalties.
The Roye Realty Court clearly erred in relying on Walden for the definition of
production in Oklahoma. Instead, the court should have found that gas was
"produced" for the purpose of the gas royalty clause when the well was capable of
producing and the lessee had the gas by entering into a gas purchase contract.
2. Wood v. TXO Production
Equally questionable is the Roye Realty court's reliance on Wood v. TXO Production Corp.' for the assertion that a sale only occurs once gas enters the pipeline.
In Wood, the Oklahoma Supreme Court answered a certified question for the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma which asked: "Is an oil
and gas lessee/operator who is obligated to pay the lessor '3/16 at the market price
at the well for the gas sold,' entitled to deduct the cost of gas compression from the
lessor's royalty interest?"" The court answered in the negative." 5
A royalty owner is entitled to a share of production without bearing the costs of
production." 6 However, the physical extraction of gas from the ground is merely
one step in what may be a series of activities necessary for gas to be "produced"
and delivered to the pipeline. The gas may undergo several processing stages to
improve its quality and increase its selling price before it is delivered. Naturally,
courts are frequently called upon to determine which costs may be assessed to
royalty owners and which costs must be borne exclusively by the lessee/operator as
costs of production. The question before the Wood court was such an issue.
In determining that compression costs could not be passed on to the royalty
owners, the court held that when the gas is sold on the premises, as it was in Wood,
there are no transportation costs assessed against the royalty owner."' Finding that
compression costs are derived from the process of delivering the gas to the pipeline,
the court concluded that the lessee incurred the costs while fulfilling his obligation
to make the gas marketable."' As such, they could not be assessed against the
lessor's royalty interest."9
The cost issue presented in Wood was of an entirely different nature than the
royalty issue in Roye Realty and should not have been relied on by the court in
coming to its decision. A lessee has an obligation to develop, produce, and make
the gas available for market under the lease, the costs of which are not attributable
to the lessor's royalty interest.'" The lessee's implied duty to market means the
duty to get the product to the place of sale in marketable form.'

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

854 P.2d 880 (Okla. 1992).
Id. at 880.
See id
See 1 EUGENE 0. KuNTz, A TREArISE ON THE LAw OF OIL & GAS § 15.4, at438 (1987).
See Wood, 854 P.2d at 881-82.
See id at 881.
See id. at 883.
See id.
See id at 882.
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Under Tara, a lessee satisfies his duty to market the gas upon entering into a gas
purchase contract with the pipeline." Consequently, the determination of where
the gas is "sold" as part of calculating what costs are assessed against the lessor's
royalty interest, as was the case in Wood, does not resolve the issue of whether a
sale has occurred, for the purpose of determining a royalty obligation." The Tara
decision suggests that gas may be considered sold upon execution of the gas
purchase contract, given the fact that a lessee satisfies his royalty obligation upon
entering into an arm's-length purchase contract with a pipeline. Nor is the holding
of Wood inconsistent with the principle of allowing a royalty owner a share of takeor-pay proceeds. Courts applying Arkansas law have also held that lessees may not
deduct compression costs from royalties," 4 but allows royalty on take-or-pay
settlement proceeds."n The Roye Realty court's reliance on Wood is clearly
erroneous as a basis for denying royalty owners a share in settlement proceeds, and
conflicts with jurisdictions that have previously decided identical issues in betterreasoned opinions.
C. FairnessRequires the Inclusion of Take-or-Pay Proceeds in Royalty Payments
Moreover, practical reasons exist for allowing royalty owners to share in the
settlement proceeds from take-or-pay litigation. When a producer/lessee settles with
the pipeline, he is either allowing for the repudiation of the contract itself or
modifying the price term in exchange for a substantial amount of money as
damages. While the lessee reaps the entire benefit of this settlement, the lessor
receives nothing, and is now forced, under Tara, to receive a substantially reduced
royalty payment calculated on the new, lower contract price.
This outcome directly conflicts with the reasoning behind Tara in binding the
lessors to the gas purchase contracts. The Tara court, in declining to calculate
royalty payments on the higher, current price for gas, noted that the lessees "did not
themselves profit in any way from the increases in gas prices. ' "" The court was

122. See Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269, 1273 (Okla. 1981).
123. Producers may argue that adopting the same definition of production in the royalty clause as
is applied to the habendum clause would require lessees to pay royalties anytime they entered into a gas
purchase agreement, even before gas is extracted from the ground or payment from the pipeline is
received. Once again, however, there is a conceptual difference between the elements constituting the

price for gas, which determines the amount of the royalty payment, and the triggering event which
requires the payment to be made. For example, if a lessee entered into a gas purchase contract whereby
he was to receive $10 million up front for gas that was to be delivered 6 months later, there would be
little doubt that the $10 million constituted the price for the gas. Yet, the lessee may not be required to
tender payment to the royalty owner until delivery of the gas was made. Take-or-pay payments are
similar in that they are advance payments made for gas which may be "made up" or delivered at a later
date. The settlement of these take-or-pay contracts deprives the lessor an opportunity for the payment
triggering event (the delivery) to occur. The settlement proceeds can therefore be viewed as constituting
part of the price of gas already taken, entitling the royalty owner to share, or payment for gas that could
"havebeen taken butfor the lessee's breach of its marketing duty to its lessor, thereby entitling the royalty
owner to damages.
124. See Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor, 759 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Ark. 1988).
125. See Klein v. Jones, 980 F.2d 521, 531-32 (8th Cir. 1992).
126. Tara, 630 P.2d at 1274.
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concerned about the intrinsic "fairness" of requiring the lessee to pay royalties on
fluctuating gas prices while their revenues remained constant under the gas purchase
contract.' n However, the court limited its holding, noting that if the lessee did not
protect the lessor's interests when executing the contract, he has not discharged his
duty to market the gas."
At least one prominent commentator espouses the same view. In Summers'
treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas, he writes:
Generally, [in take-or-pay settlements] the lessee is given a cash
payment in exchange either for a release or a modification of volume
or price obligations imposed upon the purchaser by the gas contract. In
either event, the lessee is trading off contract terms that benefit both the
lessor and the lessee for benefits that go into the lessee's pockets. The
lessee's judgment should be subject to scrutiny under the reasonable
prudent operator standard, and there is a strong argument that the
benefits of the settlement, buy-down or buy-out should be shared
proportionately."
It would be unduly harsh to allow the producers to retain all of the take-or-pay
settlement proceeds while forcing lessors to accept new, lower contract prices. In
these settlements, lessees realize substantial revenues that should be shared with the
lessor. The settlements deny the lessors the right to receive royalties on gas sold at
the old contract prices under the Tara approach. In executing these settlements, the
lessees are not protecting the lessor's interests. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
should be as concerned about the intrinsic fairness to the royalty owners as it was
about the fairness to the producers in Tara. If the lessor's interests are to be
adequately protected with regard to take-or-pay settlement proceeds, they should be
entitled to share in those proceeds.
V. Conclusion
In rendering its decision in Roye Realty v. Watson, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
reached a startling decision in a brief and poorly reasoned opinion. By holding that
royalty owners are not entitled to share in take-or-pay settlement proceeds, the court
deviated from its practice of looking past the specific language in oil and gas leases
to determine the intent of the parties. In doing so, the court allowed lessees the
means to reap enormous benefits through take-or-pay settlements while denying
lessors their fair share.
The court declined to follow the lead of Arkansas and Louisiana courts, which
have adopted the cooperative venture theory in regard to take-or-pay payments. The
positions espoused by these jurisdictions, while in the minority, were consistent with
interpretive principles applied in Oklahoma. Instead, the Oklahoma Supreme Court

127. See id. at 1273.
128. See id. at 1274.
129. 3A SUMMERS, supra note 98, at 42.
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chose to apply the reasoning of Texas courts addressing this issue, despite the fact
that Oklahoma has consistently rejected Texas definitions of "production" and
"market value" in gas leases.
The court's opinion in Roye Realty does little to explain the foundation for the
court's conclusions, and fails to discuss applicable Oklahoma case law that conflicts
with the position announced by the court. Most alarming of all, the court's
judgement was based on misstated holdings from inapplicable cases, raising serious
precedential concerns for future oil and gas issues. Instead of taking the opportunity
to definitely resolve an issue of great importance in Oklahoma, the court simply
added to the confusion.
James Muenker
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